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Introduction 
 This working paper presents an analytical scheme how to proceed with the study 
of public history, in the sense of public memory-building, in particular. It is divided into 
two parts: first, I put forward six arguments concerning the study of public history and 
memory-building in general and give a few examples, mainly from Finland but also from 
elsewhere in Europe and the wider world, and secondly, I propose a methodology to 
examine a special field of memory studies, that of memorial or commemorative 
speeches.1 
 
 At first, it is appropriate to define the concept of public history. I understand by it 
non-academic history discourses or such discourses which use or abuse arguments and 
views on history in public for partisan, day-to-day political and ideological purposes.2 
Instances of this are, for example, everyday history debates and quarrels in the media and 
politicians’ high-flown declarations on history (one authoritative representative of the 
genre from Finland is the Presidential New Year’s address on TV to the nation in which 
past, present and future are always nicely and neatly combined in a ‘success story’ which 
transmits a positive message to the nation).    
 
Public history and contrasting memories 
 The argument concerning the analytical framework to study public history and 
memory-building is divided here into six intertwined points:  
 The first point: The rise of public history is bound up with the nation-building (-
dismantling), and thus it is important to study the mechanisms through which such ab-
stract ideas as nation can be creatively communicated. This should help us to tackle how 
different, collective identities are being created and new memories are being manufac-
tured or old revived in public history debates.  One important modern dimension of this 
                                                
1 This working paper in a revised version of the project plan for the Academy of Finland titled:  ‘The 
Cults of National Lights, Finland and Hungary c. 1750—2000’ coauthored by Anssi Halmesvirta and 
Kustaa H.J. Vilkuna. University of Jyväskylä, Dept. of History and Ethnology, September 2011, pp. 12 
(manuscript). 






is nationalist myth-making. As we all know, leaders of a nation tell blatant lies or fabri-
cate more or less fictional stories to their own people about their national past thus 
building false, collective public memory.  
 
 For example, they either deny that their nation has done things it has actually done 
– for instance, Russians who have a very patriotic collective memory, denied until very 
recently that the Red Army attacked Finland at the outbreak of the Winter War and 
claimed that it was Finland that provoked it – or they claim that it has done certain 
things it has not done (for example, Russians still cherish the very idea that the Red 
Army ‘freed’ Eastern Europe in 1944–45, irrespective how the  ‘freed’ interpreted it and 
how short-lived the freedom’ was). On one hand, the purpose is to create powerful sense 
of group identity among the public – misleadingly called ‘nation’– because it is necessary 
for building and maintaining a nation-state. For example, in highlighting the significance 
of Winter War as a collective memory site for the Finns, some patriots are so convinced 
that it has made a permanent impact on Finnish identity that they demand a special 
Winter War monument to be erected on a central square in Helsinki. On the other hand, 
this identity-building by memory-mongers is aimed at portraying the nation-state in a 
favorable light by self-glorification and -whitewashing, and depicting rival or enemy 
states in a derogatory, dark light by other-maligning (for instance, the Finns developed 
not only Russophobia but a deep hatred of Russians in the 1920s–1930s).  
 
 Inventing these myths and stereotypes – ingrained and buried in memory – in-
variably requires lying about the historical record as well as contemporary political 
events.3 As Ernst Renan already put it: “Historical error is a crucial factor in the creation 
of a nation”. For example, the French needed to accentuate the positive image of the na-
tion’s past by passing a law (!) in 2005, which mandated that high school textbooks must 
                                                
3 For the relationship of memory and history, see Allan Megill, Historical Knowledge, Historical Error. 
University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 2007, esp. part 1.  
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henceforth emphasize the glorious aspects of French colonialism, and it seems that 
French people hungered for this myth since they wanted to be told stories about 
‘cleansed’ past. Although the French have confessed that their wartime Vichy govern-
ment was responsible for deportations of Jews to concentration camps, they have found 
it difficult to confess the crimes the French colonial administration committed, for ex-
ample in Congo. The same forgetfulness has haunted the Finns, too, as they seem to 
want to wash from their memories the concentration camps which the occupant Finnish 
forces established in Eastern Karelia during in 1941–1944 and in which ethnic cleansing 
was practiced.   
 
 To continue the first point: National elites also create national myths to gain in-
ternational legitimacy. Their pay-offs may be small since it is difficult to hoodwink out-
siders with stories that are at odds with a fair or realistic reading of the historical record. 
However, sometimes this succeeds remarkably well. Look at states with influential dias-
pora which export its myths to the countries where the diaspora is located.  Perhaps the 
best example of this involves Israel and the American Jewish community. There is no 
way that the Zionists could create a Jewish state in Palestine without doing large-scale 
ethnic cleansing of the Arab population that had been living there for centuries. The 
opportunity to expel the Palestinians came in early 1948 when fighting broke out be-
tween the Palestinians and the Zionists in the wake of the United Nations’ decision to 
partition Palestine into two states. The Zionists cleansed roughly 700,000 Palestinians 
from the land that became Israel, and adamantly refused to let them return to their 
homes once the fighting stopped. Not surprisingly, Israel and its American friends went 
to great lengths after 1948 to blame the expulsion of the Palestinians on the Palestinians 
themselves. According to the myth that was invented, the Palestinians were not cleansed 
by the Zionists; instead, they were said to have fled from their homes because the sur-
rounding Arab countries told them to move out so that their armies could move in and 
the drive the Jews into the Mediterranean. The Palestinians could then return home after 
the Jews had been cleansed from the land. This story was widely accepted not only in 






convincing the international public to look favorably on Israel in its ongoing conflict 
with the Palestinians. This is presently a contentious subject not just because the Pales-
tinians have a growing voice in the discourse, but also because a handful of scholars have 
challenged Israel’s founding myth. As one might expect, most Israelis and their support-
ers have not changed their thinking about it, but instead have redoubled their efforts to 
sell it to the wider public.  
 
 Myth-making of the origin of the nation has been very much in vogue also in 
Finland, though much more peacefully than in Israel. It is well-known that a place or an 
ancient community called Kalevala, the womb of the Finnish culture presumably located 
in Russian Karelia, never existed there, but many Finns seem to have memories relating 
to it passed on by oral tradition from generation to generation.  There have also been 
staged public displays of Kalevala, for example, in singing the old runes of the Finns dur-
ing folk music festivals and in ‘reality’ movies made of the adventures of the Kalevala’s 
heroes. All this is, of course, quite innocent but usually rather naïve cultural revival, and 
prone to disseminate ‘memories’ without much or any historical foundation.  When the 
Finns were asked which pictures they best preserve in their memories, it was found out 
that quite a few of them are Akseli Gallén-Kallela’s paintings inspired by Kalevala -themes. 
They form, as it were, an essential part of the national picture-album engraved in the 
collective memory of the Finns. And still nowadays, they can make a choice: one can 
either remember or forget Kalevala, but unknowingly every Finn takes part in negotiating 
its meaning.  
 
 Politically more serious than Kalevala-myths for the Finns has been the origin myth 
of the independent Finnish state. It was developed and officially formulated by President 
Urho Kekkonen who in a speech to the nation in the mid-1960s declared in the spirit of 
Finlandization – a term rooted in German political vocabulary – that it was Mr Lenin of 
the Soviet Russia who gave Finland its independence as a gift when he signed the recog-
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nition of it in St. Petersburg in late December, 1917. This declaration was a guarantee of 
the continuation of Soviet and Finnish friendship and good neighborhood policy booked 
in the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance signed in 1948.  It was 
as if Finland could not have become independent without the overthrow of the Tsarist 
regime by the ‘beneficent godfather’, Lenin. It took long for historians to challenge this 
politically-biased interpretation.  It was only in 2008, long after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, that it could be said with force to the public that Lenin’s nationality policy did 
not aim at creating independent border-states but at integrating them, including also 
Finland into the Soviet system in an opportune future moment. In spite of this refuta-
tion of Lenin’s role in a critical phase in Finnish history, Kekkonen’s memory in the 
Finnish minds remains very positive – he was the only man who could save Finland in 
the turmoil of the Cold War. Lenin was his hobby-horse to appeal sentiments of the So-
viet leadership. 
 
 Another type of this mythologization of the past and devious memory-building is 
insistence on such memories that are highly contested or unverified by physical or his-
torical evidence: for instance, there were in Lappeenranta, a Karelian town in Eastern 
Finland, widespread ‘memories’ concerning wartime executions of some 300 deserters 
from the Eastern front. Some people seemed to remember the site where their bodies 
had been buried and demanded their exhumation and decent burial in a cemetery. When 
local authorities were reluctant to take measures, they organized a newspaper campaign 
demanding financial support from the Government. They were able to gain some money 
and the supposed burial site was dug up. Nothing was found and official documents re-
veal nothing, but the ‘memory’ of the execution and of the secret burial place persis-
tently lingers on.  
 
 The second point:  Public history remains open to and usable in political struggles, and 
as such it appears to contain and promote particular (partisan) interests, and it concerns 
alignments and representations of power. For instance, to take again an example close to 






temporary history of Finland’s accession to the European Union (1995) is shown in dras-
tically different lights. The candidates of the pro-Union majority (intellectuals, urban 
bourgeoisie and the working class) see it in a positive light whereas the anti-Union can-
didates of the agrarian population and the so called ‘true Finns’ find every fault in it. The 
critical economic situation in Southern Europe has inflamed the issue, over which Finns 
are at the moment sharply divided. Thus the divided memories of Finland’s accession to 
European Union reflect the political divide, and the man of the street is ready to re-
member either of these public history narrations depending on which political interest is 
closer to his own vision.   
 
 My third point: There are creative radical or oppositional representations of public 
history which challenge the state (or church) control for recollection, commemoration 
and publication.  Here I take one example from my home village (Kiuruvesi) in Savo, in 
Central Finland, where the memory of the Civil War between the Reds (Socialists and 
Communists with crofters) and Whites (the bourgeoisie with great landowners) of the 
year 1918, to which also some German troops greatly contributed, is still very much 
alive. Following the defeat of the Reds in spring 1918, the so called White Terror started, 
and in my home village some Reds were summarily executed nearby the village ceme-
tery.  Their corpses were, however, buried in a far-off forest which later became the 
‘Red’ cemetery. The ‘Red’ memories were awakened in the 1990s when local Socialists 
proposed in the village council that a monument should be erected in the memory of the 
Reds on the spot of their execution. The extreme right-wing parties in the council op-
posed this heavily as they sensed that a ‘Reddish’ monument too close to the cemetery of 
the Whites would ‘insult’ the memory of the White martyrs of the Civil War buried 
there. So sensitive the issue became that after some skirmish, the idea of the Red monu-
ment was dropped as the village council majority voted against it.  Finally, the Reds de-
cided to erect their own monument in the far-off cemetery of their own. In this way, 
   9 
 
two contradictory interpretations of the memory of the Civil War still live in the village 
today irrespective of what the professional historians have already agreed on it.  
 
 The fourth point: Public history displays and representations more often than not deal 
with ‘winners’ (great men, heroes, sages, cultic figures) and ‘losers’ or ‘victims’ (anti-
heroes, anti-cult figures) positing such moral polarities that incite controversies (e.g. con-
troversies over the message of statues of heroes of all sorts). One recent example of this 
was the erection of a statue of ex-President Ronald Reagan at a central square (Szabadság 
tér) in Budapest in Hungary. Its promoters told to the public that it did not only sym-
bolize the emancipation of the Hungarians from the ‘colonial’ tyranny of the Soviet sys-
tem but that it signaled Reagan had freed all Europe from Communism. In contrast, the 
statues of the Communist ‘losers’ have been removed from the city to a far-off statue 
park, nowadays a cult-site for Socialist nostalgia-mongers. And for sure, one cannot find 
any statues of Gorbachev in Budapest squares. In this way, as the Finnish and Hungarian 
examples show, memories of personalities are either suppressed or revived, depending on 
which side of the political spectrum one happens to align oneself and on which sides 
happens to have the power. 
 
 Another example of the demise of Communist heroism was the Bronze-statue con-
troversy in Tallinn, Estonia, where the Estonians demanded the removal of the statue of 
Soviet war-heroes from a central square as it ‘insulted’ the Estonian sense of independ-
ence. They no longer wanted to see these ‘liberators’ whom they now regarded as sym-
bols of ‘suppression’ whereas the Estonian Russians still venerate them as their own he-
roes.  After some violent outbursts the statue was removed to a less prominent place, but 
in Estonia history and contrasting memory cultures are still being purposely used to ex-
acerbate discord between the Estonian majority and the Russian minority.  
 
 In Finland, the memory of revolutionary Socialism is well-preserved in the only 
Lenin-museum in the world. It is situated in Tampere, city of the traditional working-






forgetting the memory of the victims of Communism and cherishing the cult of Lenin, 
whom they regard as one of history’s devils. The Director of the museum rightfully de-
fends his position: in his view, pictures and other objects associated with Lenin just show 
him as a person who signed the document which recognized Finland’s independence in 
1917 and the museum is dedicated to this act – a kind of minimal gesture of reverence 
without a tint of Finlandization.   
 
 The fifth point: People evidently – as also the examples cited above tend to illustrate – 
creatively invest emotions to past events or persons, and TV and internet provide sensual 
immediacy to it. It would be worthwhile to study how this bears on public history and 
individualized views of about history and memory. It seems that memories created by 
public media are becoming more intimate so that some people are somehow cherishing 
their own memories privately (or within family circles) about important events in the 
national past, usually the shrine of collective memory. Is this a sign of skepticism or a 
silent protest against over-politicized public history?  At least in Finland, popularity of 
local, village, or family history is quite high and many amateur historians run after 
memories of the elderly people which are about to be forgotten.  For instance, the veter-
ans of the Second World War are a target group of some 20.000 survivors, the memories 
of whom the interviewers regard as the ‘conclusive evidence’ of what the war emotion-
ally really was.  
 
 The last point: The hypothesis that also public history is ‘owned’ and memory-
building controlled and manipulated by some particular interest groups stands to test. 
Also in Finland, the so called consensual, positive interpretation of Finnish history 
dominated public history platforms at least until the turn of the millennium. Maybe it 
was Finland’s Europeanization after 1995 that brought a change with it. The dominant 
interpretation highlighting ‘success’ of the nation and the state (‘from a ‘backward’ agrar-
ian province of Russia to an independent,  ‘progressive’ and streamlined welfare society’) 
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was challenged from many quarters and quite a few underdog views of history and 
downtrodden memories came to the fore. Let it suffice here to point to just four exam-
ples of them: (1) the history of gypsies in Finland who were forcefully Christianized in 
special educational camps until 1960s, (2) the stories of the about 70.000 war-orphans in 
Finland, (3) the narratives of the about 10.000 so called war-children transported to Swe-
den and (4) the life-histories of those women who fell in love with the German soldiers 
in Lapland in the end of the Second World War (the Lapland War) and who were stig-
matized as non-persons in Finland. Gestures towards reconciliation and understanding, 
even forgiving have been made4, and the above mentioned groups of people have lately 
been given platform to speak for themselves.   However, a question remains: If democra-
tization has brought about an increase of demands to the effect that underdog (e.g. mi-
nority) voices should be heard and their memories should be recorded, how has it 
changed the image of history of a particular underdog or minority group? Or alterna-
tively, do they want to lose that history and forget the bleak and dismal parts of their 
past? This would be an interesting field of study for oral and memo-history. 
 
Memory-speeches as a field of memo-history  
 The second part of this paper examines one neglected theme of public history stud-
ies, namely commemoration as expressed, preserved and reworked in memorial speeches. 
This thematic is at the moment one of the most up-to-date in the field of memory studies 
Finland, and there is a project of the Academy of Finland built around it and organized 
by the University of Jyväskylä. 
 
 To begin with, there was a commonly held belief in nationalism that if a nation 
does not have (collective) memories, it may not be revered and can be forgotten, even 
destroyed. The more beautiful the memories are, the better for the nation. Patriotism 
was (is) based on memories and they have to be cherished, and in this sense, notwith-
standing all the deconstructive tendencies, its enchantment remains, at least in populist 
                                                
4 Cf. Paul Ricouer, Memory, History, Forgetting. Transl. by Kathleen Blamey & David Pellaeur. The University 






and neo-nationalistic discourses. The firmer memories could be attached to a concrete 
object which made sacrifices for the nation, the better. The object could be a national 
institution or a celebrated person, a hero, 'light' or a sage who had educated the nation 
and been a model for all. That person surely is worth remembering and his memory is 
kept alive by regular memorial acts. 
 
 Consequently, it may not be amiss to study patriotic and national memories and 
concentrate on the memories fashioned around such personalities and institutions that 
were depicted as educators of a nation. Only after this, one can proceed to studying cult 
practices and systems built in public history (as defined above) to honor and adore these 
sublime institutions and persons in the process of pantheonization.5  
 
 One may say that this salient genre of national memory-building and culture em-
bedded in memorial speeches (usually given to prominent people after their funeral) can 
be typified as communicative acts (latest example from Finland: in late Conservative PM 
Harri Holkeri’s funeral, speeches were given with different patriotic/nationalist histori-
cizing voice and tone by highest authorities, the present PM Jyrki Katainen and Presi-
dent Tarja Halonen). They are regarded as speech-acts that do not only express reverence 
for the ‘great’ (sages, statesmen, war-heroes, and other cult-figures of among artists, sci-
entists etc.) and their virtues but present to the audience a wider vision of ‘national’, 
public mission fulfilled by them. Prominent is the speech-situation in which the speaker 
or orator:  
A) Interprets the (nationalistic, neo-nationalistic, patriotic) ethos of the times,  
B) Performs the speech-act itself,  
                                                
5 Cf. Porkoláb Tibor, “Közösségi emlékezet, ceremonialitás, panteonizáció. Szempontok az emlékbeszéd műfajának vizs-
gálatához”. In: Zsusza Kalla, Takáts József, Tverdota György (Szerk.), Kultusz, Mü, Identitás. Kultusztörté-
neti tanulmányok 4 (Petöfi Irodalmi Múzeum, Budapest, 2005), 56-88; “Editor’s Introduction”.  In: Cultic 
Revelations.  Studies in Modern Historical Cult Personalities and Phenomena. Ed. Anssi Halmesvirta. 
Spectrum Hungarologicum, vol. 4. (Jyväskylä – Pécs, 2010), 13-18. 
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C) Shows eloquence,  
D) Aims at pleasing the audience,  
E) Praises the dead (laudation),  
F) Offers epidictic (show-off) amplification of feeling, and  
G) Sometimes assumes a poet’s role.  
 
 It is all these aspects that should be taken into account in order to explain and un-
derstand the means by which, for example, memory of a person or a personality cult is 
being constructed and kept alive through generations.  One also has to study the long-
term continuum and the varying contexts of the memorial speeches dedicated to the ‘a 
great person’ since this is the means by which one can detect and analyze the changes of 
commemorative tone and voice in a specific political culture.  
 
 From the methodological point of view, a few hypotheses of what the memorial 
speech is can be put forward: 
  1) It is a document of the frame of mind of an age, and in this sense it can 
be studied by methods of intellectual history,  
 2) It shows how a person was significant to his times as evaluated by his 
fellow-men,  
 3) It does not only ‘speak out’ a personality cult but manifests a cultic 
meaning of a leading idea or ideology of an age. 
 4) It provides self-affirmation of identity to the audience,  
 5) It paints a publicly moralized portrait of the character of the ‘great per-
son’,  
 6) It has an independent, pragmatic function in a political culture (as part 
of public history and memory culture),  
 7) It blurs the borderline between audience and the orator (I = We),  
 8) It tends to homogenize a society by abolishing hierarchies, 
 9) It re-creates continuity to personality cults by transmitting the tradition 






 10) It can express bias from the part of the orator, and 
 11) It has many modes (lament, consolation, appeasement, reprimand, con-
fession etc.) to express feeling. 
 
 This list leads to one more general point: that the memorial speeches are ceremo-
nial acts which are performed at various levels of history-political culture ranging from 
every-day funeral speeches to memorial speeches delivered, e.g. at yearly meetings of 
scholarly and cultural societies, to such scientists, scholars and artists etc. who have made 
unforgettable contributions to ‘national progress’ or to similarly significant goals.   
  
 The starting-point in the long-term research of memorial speeches can be dated 
back to the early 19th century when patriotism in Europe turned into nationalism, a 
process which has continued until the present. We approach this process from the angle 
of cults – the end-products of series of memorial speeches, as it were. Human beings and 
institutions (idols), the authors, disseminators, supporters and transmitters as well as re-
writers of traditions have been neglected while the concepts and structures of national-
ism have been extensively studied.  Cult-studies can be contextualized according to the 
three phases or types through which nationalism emerged in modernity: (1) the phase of 
nation-building when nationalism was transformed from cultural revivalism towards 
political nationalism in the 19th century; (2) the interwar (c. 1918–1939) phase of aggres-
sive nationalism when nationalism assumed forms and ideas of  dreading and/or malign-
ing the ‘Other’, the potential enemy or neighbor threatening its existence and identity, 
and (3) the postwar (1945–) phase of reconstruction and re-building of the nation in the 
spirit of optimism and hope. The frame of mind of the three types of nationalism left its 
mark in the representations of cult giving them their distinctive expressions to be stud-
ied. This approach shall shed light on many factors that have influenced the development 
of nationalism in a concrete way and thus makes it possible to compare memory cultures 
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and politics in different European countries in order to create model of cult-making 
processes.  
 
 The method introduced here elevates the role of persons (‘great men’) and institu-
tions (University, schools and societies for popular enlightenment) behind patriotism 
and nationalism into focus. Memorial speeches express devotion or reverential homage 
or praise to a particular person (or a thing) as paid by a body of professed adherents or 
admirers. Personality cult arises when they create a heroic or otherwise lofty image of 
the person (statesman, scholar/scientist, sage, well-known artist) through mass media, 
propaganda, or by other means, in this case by memorial speeches. This presupposes a 
(political) culture which enhances and promotes certain ideologies or political doctrines 
and uses popularity to advocate conformity of attitudes and mentality by education and 
socialization.  
 
 The memorial speeches may have remarkable consequences for culture of com-
memoration which also have to be outlined concomitantly with the study of speech-acts 
themselves. The building of monuments and the general phenomenon of pantheoniza-
tion serve the revival and refreshing of memory. It enhances and makes the nationalist or 
neo-nationalist ideology ‘move’; it is self-congratulation as an asset to strengthen national 
identity. It institutionalizes national memory in monumental, ceremonial manner. Thus: 
the orator acts as the ‘master of the ceremony’ (praising and representing a body) and the 
memorial speech becomes the tool or vehicle to conduct it.  
 
